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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
OBERDORFER, District Judge. 
 
We here review sentencing decisions rendered by the 
District Court below in a very troubling case of murder on 
a federal reservation. On August 28, 1996, a federal grand 
jury returned an indictment charging Mitchell Frederick 
Paster with premeditated murder of his wife, Dr. Margaret 
Bostrom, by stabbing her repeatedly with a butcher knife. 
18 U.S.C. SS 7(3), 1111. At arraignment, Paster pled not 
guilty, and later noticed his intention to plead insanity. 
Thereafter, the government indicated that it would not seek 
the death penalty authorized by 18 U.S.C. S 1111(b). On the 
eve of trial, the government and Paster agreed that he 
would plead guilty to second degree murder. At the hearing 
preliminary to his acceptance of the plea, the District Judge 
elicited from the probation officer and the prosecutor their 
best estimate that, as of that time, Paster would face 
imprisonment ranging from 168 to 210 months. After a 
two-day presentence hearing, the District Court ordered 
Paster confined for 365 months. 
 
On this appeal, Paster challenges four aspects of the 
sentencing decision: 1) denial of a downward departure on 
account of Dr. Bostrom's allegedly provocative conduct; 2) 
denial of a downward departure on account of Paster's 
arguably aberrant behavior; 3) denial of an additional one- 
level downward adjustment for Paster's alleged acceptance 
of responsibility; and 4) imposition of a nine-level upward 
departure for "extreme conduct." For the reasons stated 
herein, we affirm the District Court with respect to issues 
 
one and two, reverse with respect to issue three, and 
remand for resentencing after the District Judge has an 
opportunity to reconsider his resolution of issue four in 
light of our opinion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
98 (1996). 
 




The presentence investigation report ("PSR") and Paster's 
testimony at the presentence hearing disclosed, and the 
District Court found, that Paster and Margaret met in 1985 
and married in 1994. At the time of the murder they lived 
in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where she worked as a 
psychologist at the United States Penitentiary. In the 
months immediately preceding the August 1996 stabbing, 
the couple experienced serious marital problems. One night 
in July 1996, after Margaret went out with her supervisor 
and did not come home, Paster left Lewisburg for his 
parents' home in New Jersey. While there, Paster was 
served on July 25 with divorce papers filed by his wife on 
July 18.1 Thereafter the two reportedly reconciled by 
telephone. However, on August 12, 1996, after Margaret 
revealed that she was having an affair with her supervisor, 
Paster returned to his parents' home. 
 
After further efforts to reconcile, on the night of August 
15 Paster returned home, only to find that his wife was not 
there. According to him, she drove by their home on two 
separate occasions that night. When she returned the 
following morning, he confronted her about where she had 
been. She apparently became upset, and telephoned the 
warden at the Lewisburg Penitentiary, to whom Paster had 
revealed the ongoing affair. Margaret handed Paster the 
telephone receiver, and instructed him to retract his prior 
statement to the warden. Paster told the warden that he 
would not retract the statement, despite being pressured. 
After hanging up the phone, Margaret mentioned that she 
had a friend on the reservation who kept weapons at his 
house, and that if Paster did not retract his statement she 
would entice the friend "to do whatever she wanted." She 
then told Paster that she had had between forty and fifty 
affairs during their relationship, and planned to continue to 
pursue the relationship with her supervisor. Thereupon she 
went upstairs to take a shower, leaving Paster downstairs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Paster's response to the filing was due August 15, 1996. He claims 
that his wife told him that she planned to withdraw her request for a 
divorce, but her lawyer reported having no knowledge of such plans. 
 
                                3 
  
At one point, Paster went outside and conversed with a 
neighbor, who reported later that Paster was "very calm, 
pleasant, and very soft-spoken." PSR at 9. Minutes later, 
however, he went back inside, retrieved a knife from the 
butcher block in the kitchen, proceeded upstairs, and then, 
as Margaret emerged from the shower, stabbed her with the 
knife numerous times. According to an autopsy report 
prepared by Dr. Samuel Land, a forensic pathologist, she 
died of multiple stab wounds to various vital organs. 
Specifically, Dr. Land counted sixteen stab wounds -- nine 
of which were life-threatening and six of which were to the 
heart -- and eleven slash wounds indicative of defensive 
action. Dr. Land also reported that one stab wound 
completely penetrated Margaret's sternum, and that one 
wound penetrated her body and the floor tile beneath her. 
At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Land testified that 
Margaret's death "was a very violent" one, and that it "was 
one of the most severe cases I've seen." Appendix ("App.") at 
189. 
 
After the murder, Paster telephoned his mother at her 
place of employment. He then called 911 and reported that 
he had stabbed his wife in the chest. He told the emergency 
operator his name, his telephone number, and his address, 
and described the location of the bloody knife. He remained 
on the phone until authorities arrived. First on the scene 
were personnel from the Bureau of Prisons. He told them 
that he had stabbed his wife and that she was in the 
upstairs bathroom. The BOP personnel found her body in 
the bathroom; she was lying naked on the floor in a pool of 
blood -- dead. 
 
Later that afternoon, agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation arrested Paster and took him to the Lewisburg 
Penitentiary Training Center for questioning. Atfirst, he 
said that he could not remember what happened upstairs; 
later in the interview, however, he responded that he did 
not want to talk about the events that had transpired. 
According to a February 25, 1998 presentence investigation 
report, he "remain[ed] unable to recall the actual murder, 
but acknowledged his involvement in the offense." PSR at 
10. Meanwhile, he filed, and the District Court denied, a 
motion to suppress statements that he made to 
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investigators on the theory that the FBI agents induced his 
statements by promising that he would be able to call his 
mother. 
 
In response to Paster's notice of an insanity plea, Dr. 
Robert Sadoff, a psychiatrist, concluded after two 
examinations that Paster "did not deliberate or premeditate 
this killing," and that "[t]he outward explosion of violence 
was atypical and foreign" for him. App. at 44. Dr. Sally 
Johnson, Chief Psychiatrist for the Mental Health Division 
at FCI Butner, concluded that "[t]here was no indication 
that [Paster] had formulated any plan to harm his wife," 
and that his reported symptoms of memory loss were 
consistent with dissociative amnesia. Id. at 60-61. Dr. 
Sadoff further concluded that, in his opinion, there was no 
insanity defense. Thereafter, on the eve of trial and 
pursuant to the plea agreement, Paster pled guilty to 
second degree murder, and the case entered its sentencing 
phase. 
 
In calculating Paster's sentence, the District Judge began 
from the base offense level of 33 for second degree murder. 
United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") S 2A1.2. 
He then granted a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility; denied enhancements for premeditation and 
use of a weapon; imposed a nine-level upward departure for 
extreme conduct; denied a downward departure for 
aberrant behavior; denied a downward departure for 
victim's conduct; and denied an additional one-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The District 
Court calculated an offense level of 40. Having no prior 
criminal record, Paster was in criminal history category I, 
and therefore subject to a guideline incarceration range of 
292-365 months. The District Court imposed the maximum 
for the offense level: 365 months, or thirty years and five 




Paster first argues that the District Court erred by 
denying his motion for a downward departure pursuant to 
S 5K2.10 of the guidelines. That section permits a 
downward departure "[i]f the victim's wrongful conduct 
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contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior." 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.10. Paster argued to the District Court that 
his wife's revelation of past infidelity exposed wrongful 
conduct and was the sole provocation for the fatal stabbing. 
The District Court rejected Paster's argument, reasoning 
that "[t]here is no confirmation of Paster's [sic] statements 
as to any prior affairs," and that "[t]hose allegations even if 
true do not indicate that the victim substantially provoked 
her murder." United States v. Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d 345, 
351 (M.D. Pa. 1998). Thus, the District Court wrote: "Even 
though we have the authority to depart for victim 
misconduct the conduct of the victim in this case does not 
warrant a departure." Id. We review for clear error. United 
States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 730 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
By its terms, S 5K2.10 hinges a departure on two criteria: 
1) the victim must have committed "wrongful conduct;" 2) 
and such conduct must have "contributed significantly to 
provoking the offense behavior." The policy statement 
instructs that 
 
       [i]n deciding the extent of a sentence reduction, the 
       court should consider: a) the size and strength of the 
       victim, or other relevant physical characteristics, in 
       comparison with those of the defendant; b) the 
       persistence of the victim's conduct and any efforts by 
       the defendant to prevent confrontation; c) the danger 
       reasonably perceived by the defendant, including the 
       victim's reputation for violence; d) the danger actually 
       presented to the defendant by the victim; and e) any 
       other relevant conduct by the victim that substantially 
       contributed to the danger presented. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.10. By delineating these five factors, the 
guidelines contemplates departures where the victim's 
conduct posed actual, or reasonably perceived, danger to 
the defendant, with emphasis on physical danger. Court 
decisions confirm what the context of guideline S 5K2.10 
implies: Generally only violent conduct, albeit wrongful, 
justifies a downward departure. See Blankenship v. United 
States, 159 F.3d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
1999 WL 8730 (Jan. 11, 1999) (affirming denial of 
departure because while conduct was "wrongful," it was not 
violent); see also United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 
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975 (7th Cir. 1990) (physical blocking of doorway was not 
"sufficient physical contact to provoke the attack") 
(emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 
1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990) (embracing idea that "there's 
hardly any greater provocation than to have someone 
having an affair with your spouse"). 
 
The District Court denied a S 5K2.10 departure because 
there was no danger or reasonable perception of danger to 
Paster. Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 351. There is ample record 
evidence to support the denial. First, Margaret's size and 
strength posed no threat to Paster. Second, Paster himself 
initiated the fatal confrontation. Third, the record contains 
no suggestion that Margaret had a reputation for violence; 
it was the District Court's prerogative to discount danger to 
Paster from his wife's friend. In any event, all of the 
circumstances -- Paster armed with a knife, attacking his 
wife as she emerged from a shower -- demolish his victim 
provocation claim.2 
 
The foregoing considered, it was not necessary to decide 
whether revelation of past infidelities, or the infidelities 
themselves, could ever constitute such "wrongful conduct" 
as to mitigate a sentence for murder. However, even if 
Margaret's conduct, as revealed moments before the attack, 
were wrongful within the meaning of S 5K2.10, Paster's 
response was grossly disproportionate to any provocation.3 
Shortt, 919 F.2d at 1328 ("A concern for the proportionality 
of the defendant's response is manifested by the terms of 
S 5K2.10."). See also Blankenship, 159 F.3d at 339; United 
States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1996) (concern 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This analysis easily distinguishes this case from United States v. 
Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1989), where the court of 
appeals upheld a downward departure upon consideration of 
uncontroverted evidence that the female defendant had refused the 
victim's request to engage in sexual intercourse; that the victim was 
considerably larger than the defendant; that the victim was intoxicated 
and had a history of unpredictable conduct while intoxicated; and that 
the defendant reasonably perceived a threat of danger. Id. at 651-54. 
 
3. The District Court found that on earlier occasions Paster had learned 
of his wife's infidelity, but that instead of reacting as if he were 
physically endangered, he simply "left the marital residence to live with 
parents." Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 349. 
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for proportionality "is evidenced by the factors that 
S 5K2.10 instructs the court to consider"). Cf. United States 
v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming 
departure for defendant who did not physically harm the 
victim); United States v. Tsosie, 14 F.3d 1438, 1442 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (affirming departure for defendant who was 
engaged in physical altercation with the victim). 
Accordingly, we affirm denial of a downward departure 




Paster next challenges the District Court's refusal to 
grant a downward departure for "aberrant behavior." See 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment P 4(d). This court 
addressed that ground for departure in United States v. 
Marcello, 13 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994), decided before the 
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Embracing the formula that 
originated from the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, the 
Marcello court wrote that "[a]berrant behavior must involve 
a lack of planning; it must be a single act that is 
spontaneous and thoughtless, and no consideration is 
given to whether the defendant is a first-time offender." Id. 
at 761 (emphasis added). Marcello's construction followed 
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Carey, 895 
F.2d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 1990): 
 
        A single act of aberrant behavior . . . generally 
       contemplates a spontaneous and seemingly 
       thoughtless act rather than one which was the result 
       of substantial planning because an act which occurs 
       suddenly and is not the result of a continued reflective 
       process is one for which the defendant may be 
       arguably less accountable. 
 
Carey, 895 F.2d at 325 (emphasis added). 
 
Invoking Marcello, the District Court found "indications 
that the murder was spontaneous" and that there was 
"insufficient evidence to show that Paster had planned the 
killing of his wife." Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 351. However, 
the District Court held that "the murder was not committed 
in a thoughtless manner," because, the court found, "Paster 
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had ample time in the minutes preceding the stabbing to 
think about whether to murder his wife," and "the number 
of times Paster stabbed his wife indicates that he thought 
about the act as it was being done." Id. The District Court 
concluded that "[t]here is no authority to depart on the 
basis of aberrant behavior under Marcello." Id. 
 
Paster challenges the District Court's construction of the 
term "thoughtless" as used by the Marcello court. According 
to Paster, the District Court interpreted the term to mean 
"without conscious thought" or "without intent," as 
distinguished from "without prior thought," "not well 
thought-out," or "without premeditation." Appellant's Brief 
at 34-35. He argues that this construction of "thoughtless" 
would render meaningless the concept of "aberrant 
behavior" because most crimes entail a mens rea that 
would preclude a finding of "thoughtlessness." Because 
Paster argues that the District Court misinterpreted the 
legal standard enunciated in Marcello, we exercise plenary 
review. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 411 (3d Cir. 
1996). See also United States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 
551, 554 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. 
Ct. 1855, 140 L. Ed. 2d. 1103 (1998); United States v. 
Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 561 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(undertaking plenary review because district court "adopted 
the wrong standard"). 
 
We decline to upset the District Court's decision rejecting 
departure. The District Court applied the correct legal 
standard by properly focusing on the term "thoughtless," 
because Marcello made thoughtlessness a necessary 
ingredient of aberrant behavior. 13 F.3d at 761. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The government argues that because Paster pled guilty to a crime 
defined as one committed "willfully, deliberately, maliciously" and with 
"malice aforethought," he necessarily is not eligible for a departure 
based 
on "thoughtless" activity. The government argues alternatively that 
Paster does not qualify for a departure because infliction of sixteen stab 
wounds and eleven slash wounds does not constitute "a single act" 
within the meaning of Marcello. We need not reach the former argument 
because we are satisfied that the District Court applied the proper 
standard pursuant to Marcello, and we need not reach the latter 
argument because the District Court's finding that Paster's conduct was 
not "thoughtless" makes the single act issue redundant. 
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Specifically, the District Court found that Paster "had 
ample time in the minutes preceding the stabbing to think 
about whether to murder his wife," and that "the number of 
times Paster stabbed his wife indicates that he thought 
about the act as it was being done." Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d 
at 351 (emphasis added). These penultimate findings amply 
support the ultimate finding that the murder was not 
"thoughtless." Nor does the failure of the District Court to 
make an additional ultimate finding about a "continued 
reflective process" constitute reversible error in the context 
of this case. Marcello, 13 F.3d at 761 (quoting Carey, 895 
F.2d at 325). The District Court's finding about the "ample 
time in the minutes preceding the stabbing" and the 
multiple stabbings convey the Marcello concept of a 
continuum, as distinguished from a mere "opportunity to 
consider [the] crime." Diss. Opp. at 28 (emphasis in 
original). Also, the term "reflective" used in Marcello clearly 
imports the concept of "thoughtful," the antonym of 
"thoughtless." See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 2381 (1971).5 
 
In view of the foregoing, the District Court's finding that 
Paster's conduct was not "thoughtless" was not clearly 
erroneous, and its application of the Marcello  standard 
supported the conclusion that on these facts Paster was not 
entitled to an aberrant conduct departure. Cf. Marcello, 13 
F.3d at 761 (district court's decision "not to depart, after 
applying the correct legal standard, is discretionary and 
unreviewable"). Cases from other circuits that affirmed 
denial of an aberrant behavior departure, and that pre-date 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Koon, 518 U.S. 81, see, 
e.g., United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1991), 
United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991), do not 
hold otherwise. Thus, the District Court's statement that it 
had "no authority to depart on the basis of aberrant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Marcello barrier to consideration in an aberrant behavior context 
of whether subsequent violence is "out of character" or a "first offense," 
Marcello, 13 F.3d at 761 (quoting Carey, 895 F.2d at 325), precludes 
consideration here of the apparent fact that Paster had no history of 
domestic, or any other kind, of violence, and that indeed he had reacted 
passively when his wife and her paramour separatelyflaunted their affair 
before him. Cf. Diss. Op. at 30. 
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behavior under Marcello," Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 351, 
may fairly be construed as nothing more than a conclusion 
that the facts of this case applied to the principles 
announced in Marcello do not qualify Paster for an aberrant 
behavior departure. Accordingly, we affirm denial of a 
departure for aberrant behavior. 
 
We would reach the same result were we to test our 
analysis by direct reference to Koon. Koon established that 
a sentencing court considering a departure mustfirst ask, 
"What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the 
Guidelines' `heartland' and make of it a special, or unusual, 
case?" 518 U.S. at 95 (citation omitted). Once a court 
identifies a "special" feature, it is directed to assess whether 
the Guidelines forbid, encourage, discourage, or fail to 
mention a departure based on that feature. Id. at 95-96. 
The answer to this second inquiry shapes the remaining 
analysis: 
 
        If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the 
       sentencing court cannot use it as a basis for departure. 
       If the special factor is an encouraged factor, the court 
       is authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does 
       not already take it into account. If the special factor is 
       a discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor already 
       taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the 
       court should depart only if the factor is present to an 
       exceptional degree or in some other way makes the 
       case different from the ordinary case where the factor 
       is present. If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, 
       the court must, after considering the structure and 
       theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the 
       Guidelines taken as a whole, decide whether it is 
       sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's 
       heartland. The court must bear in mind the 
       Commission's expectation that departures based on 
       grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be highly 
       infrequent. 
 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Aberrant behavior is an "unmentioned factor." See United 
States v. Kalb, 105 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir. 1997). So here, 
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the District Court relied entirely upon the Marcello 
definition of the term. Having determined that Paster's 
behavior was not aberrant within the meaning of Marcello, 
the District Court had no occasion to attempt to extrapolate 
from "the structure and theory of both relevant individual 
guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole" whether 
Paster's behavior was "sufficient to take the case out of the 
[second degree murder guideline's (S 2A1.2)] heartland." 
Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. The District Court's analysis 
therefore was consistent with both Marcello and with the 
Koon Court's caution that departures relying on 
unmentioned factors should be "highly infrequent." Id. 





Paster next argues that, even though the District Court 
granted him a two-level adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility, it erred by denying his motion for an 
additional one-level adjustment pursuant to S 3E1.1 of the 
guidelines. That section provides that a defendant is 
entitled to an additional one-level decrease if he qualifies 
for a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, his 
offense level is sixteen or greater, and he 
 
        has assisted authorities in the investigation or 
       prosecution of his own misconduct by taking one or 
       more of the following steps: (1) timely providing 
       complete information to the government concerning his 
       own involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying 
       authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, 
       thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing 
       for trial and permitting the court to allocate its 
       resources efficiently. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(b) (emphasis added). There is no dispute 
that Paster met the first two criteria of S 3E1.1: The District 
Court awarded him a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility and his offense level was greater than 
sixteen. The District Court concluded, however, that Paster 
did not qualify for the additional one-level reduction 
because his decision to plead guilty after the jury was 
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selected did not constitute timely notification within the 
meaning of S 3E1.1(b)(2). Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 353. 
 
Paster appeals this determination. First, he argues that 
although the District Court considered whether he timely 
notified the government of his intent to plead guilty, it 
failed to consider whether he timely provided complete 
information concerning his involvement in the crime. Paster 
argues further that his statements to the Bureau of Prisons 
personnel who responded to his call to 911 support a 
finding that he timely provided complete information 
concerning his involvement in the crime -- and therefore 
should have received the additional one-level reduction. 
Because Paster contends that the District Court committed 
legal error, we review de novo. United States v. Maurello, 76 
F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
We are persuaded that Paster has the better of this 
argument. The third prong of S 3E1.1(b) is in the 
disjunctive. United States v. Lancaster, 112 F.3d 156, 158 
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 86 F.3d 1203, 
1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 
1391 (9th Cir. 1995). By its plain terms, it is satisfied if the 
defendant "has assisted authorities in the investigation or 
prosecution of his own misconduct by taking one or more of 
the following steps: (1) timely providing complete 
information to the government concerning his own 
involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying 
authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty . . . ." 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(b) (emphasis added). The District Court 
considered only whether Paster satisfied the latter criterion, 
not whether he satisfied the former. Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d 
at 353. Accordingly, the District Court erred as a matter of 
law by failing to apply S 3E1.1(b)'s disjunctive standard. 
Maurello, 76 F.3d at 1308. 
 
The government argues that even if the District Court 
erred, Paster still is not entitled to the additional one-level 
reduction because "throughout the investigation .. . and 
continuing through his interview with the Probation Officer 
. . ., [he] continually attempted to minimize his role in the 
offense." Appellee's Brief at 27-28 (emphasis in original). 
For example, the government alludes to evidence that 
Paster initially told investigators that he did "not 
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remember" much of what happened -- belied, the 
government says, by his admissions to the emergency 
operator -- and that he "did not want to talk about it." Id. 
at 28. The government also cites psychiatric reports and 
the presentence investigation report, which purportedly 
document that Paster attempted to ascribe blame for the 
killing to his wife's revelation of infidelity. 
 
The government's argument cannot cure the District 
Court's failure to focus on and make findings with respect 
to S 3E1.1(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1 app. note 5. See also 
United States v. Marroquin, 136 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 
1998); United States v. Ortiz, 63 F.3d 952, 955-56 (10th 
Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the record contains evidence 
that supports an additional one-level reduction. For 
example, the District Court found that Paster called 911, 
reported that he had stabbed his wife, provided directions 
to his home and the location of the weapon, remained on 
the phone until authorities arrived, and cooperated with 
authorities while the crime scene was investigated. Paster, 
17 F. Supp.2d at 347-49. The District Court also concluded 
that "Paster has never denied that he stabbed and killed his 
wife." Id.6 While the District Court found that Paster "was 
unable to remember many of the details of the murder" 
when questioned by FBI agents, id. at 348, the 
government's psychiatrist concluded that Paster suffered 
from dissociative amnesia, App. at 60, an opinion that 
supports a finding of genuine memory loss rather than 
obdurate or unhelpful conduct. Finally, that the 
government may have been able to learn of Paster's offense 
independent of his assistance does not preclude an 
additional one-level reduction, United States v. Stoops, 25 
F.3d 820, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1994); neither does the fact that 
Paster filed a motion to suppress. Id. The District Court's 
findings establish that no reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that Paster was not entitled to an additional one- 
level reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 
1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we reverse and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This finding serves to distinguish this case from United States v. 
Chee, 
110 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1997), where the court affirmed denial of the 
additional one-point reduction because the defendant consistently denied 
certain alleged conduct. Id. at 1494. 
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remand for Paster to be resentenced to reflect an additional 




Paster's final, and most extensive, challenge is a multi- 
pronged one to the nine-level upward departure pursuant 
to Sentencing Guidelines S 5K2.8, "Extreme Conduct." That 
section authorizes an upward departure "[i]f the defendant's 
conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading 
to the victim." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8. The guideline explains that 
"[e]xamples of extreme conduct include torture of a victim, 
gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or 
humiliation." Id. Here, after summarizing the evidence, the 
District Court concluded that some "upward departure 
based upon Paster's unusually heinous, cruel, and brutal 
conduct is warranted." Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 349-50. It 
then imposed a nine-level upward departure. Id. at 350. 
The departure increased the adjusted guideline range from 
108-135 months to 292-365 months. The top-of-the-range 
365-month sentence actually imposed is 213.5 months 
greater than the median of the range for base second 
degree murder (135-168 months), to which Paster pled 
guilty. As contemplated by then-Judge Becker's seminal 
opinion in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d 
Cir. 1990), we appraise the level of proof required by the 
district court, the propriety of any departure, and the 




Paster first argues that the District Court erred by not 
articulating and applying a clear and convincing burden of 
proof to support the nine-level upward departure. In 
support of this claim, Paster cites Kikumura, 918 F.2d 
1084, which established that when a departure "is 
sufficiently great that the sentencing hearing can be fairly 
characterized as `a tail which wags the dog of the 
substantive offense,' . . . the factfinding underlying that 
departure must be established at least by clear and 
convincing evidence." Id. at 1101 (quoting McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). See also United 
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States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 254, 142 L. Ed. 2d 209 
(1998). The government concedes that the magnitude of the 
departure here imposed, compared to a base second degree 
murder sentence, requires clear and convincing evidence, 
and that the District Court did not expressly recite the clear 
and convincing formula; it argues, nonetheless, that the 
evidence met the requisite legal standard. We agree: 
Incantation of the term "clear and convincing" was not 
necessary on this record. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104. 
 
Paster contends that the District Court not only failed to 
recite the proper standard; it failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that his conduct was unusually 
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim. This 
argument is unconvincing. Paster never repudiated his 
prior admissions that he killed his wife. Nor did he dispute 
the extensive and gory evidence concerning the killing, 
including the expert pathologist's extensive and 
uncontradicted testimony about the sixteen stab wounds, 
the eight to nine penetrations of the heart area, and the 
eleven incisive wounds that Paster inflicted on his wife. 
Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 348-49. See App. at 189 ("This 
was one of the most severe cases I've seen."). This 
unchallenged evidence was clear and convincing proof of 




Paster next argues that the District Court erred by 
enhancing his sentence for extreme conduct because the 
Sentencing Commission regarded second degree murder, 
per se, as unusually heinous, cruel, and brutal and 
established guidelines that adequately punish perpetrators 
on that assumption. According to Paster, the unusually 
heinous, cruel, and brutal character of his conduct was 
reflected in S 2A1.2, the guideline for second degree 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Citing Beardshall v. Minuteman Press International, Inc., 664 F.2d 23, 
26-27 (3d Cir. 1981), Paster argues that the District Court committed 
plain error by not reciting the clear and convincing formula. In 
Beardshall, the district judge failed to instruct the jury on the 
applicable 
burden of proof, quite a different matter. 
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murder, and in the offense level there established. His 
argument finds tangential support in this court's 
observation in Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1118, that the 
attempted murder guideline "plainly accounts for the fact 
that attempted murder, by its very nature, involves heinous 
conduct." Id. The government counters that the District 
Court's specific factual findings support a determination 
that by any definition Paster's conduct was unusually 
heinous, cruel, and brutal. Again, we find ample support 
for the government's position. 
 
By now it is familiar that when a factor is an 
"encouraged" basis for departure, the task of the sentencing 
court is to determine whether that factor is taken into 
account by the relevant guideline. Koon v. United States, 
518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). Unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or 
degrading conduct is an encouraged factor under S 5K2.8, 
so the court below was obligated to assess whether 
unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading conduct is 
within the heartland of conduct encompassed by S 2A1.2. 
Id. at 93-96. Ordinarily, a determination of "[w]hether a 
given factor is present to a degree not adequately 
considered by the Commission" will be made "in large part 
by comparison with the facts of other Guidelines cases." Id. 
at 98. Because of the "institutional advantage" of district 
courts in making such factual determinations, appellate 
courts accord considerable deference to their departure 
decisions, limiting review on appeal to abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 98-100. 
 
We are satisfied that the District Court exercised 
appropriate discretion in determining that Paster's conduct 
was sufficiently more heinous than conduct that 
constitutes the so-called "heartland" of second degree 
murders. Id. at 93-94. The judge specifically noted, for 
example, that Paster stabbed Margaret sixteen times with a 
butcher knife, that eight or nine of the wounds penetrated 
the heart area, that ten of the wounds were immediately 
life-threatening, and that Paster also inflicted eleven 
incisive wounds. Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 349. The judge 
also observed photographs of the victim that "graphically 
demonstrate the heinous and extreme nature of Paster's 
crime." Id. While the judge did not compare Paster's case 
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with other second degree murders, the gripping detailed 
testimony effectively demonstrates that Paster's crime was 
unusually violent and brutal. We are satisfied that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to 
depart for extreme conduct. See United States v. Murray, 
144 F.3d 270, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 




In approving an extreme conduct departure, we do not 
overlook Paster's argument that the departure was literally 
inappropriate because his conduct matched none of the 
specific examples delineated by S 5K2.8:"torture of a 
victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain 
or humiliation." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8. Paster argues that this 
list of examples is exhaustive, citing United States v. Kelly, 
1 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1993). However, the Kelly court 
ruled only that by articulating specific examples of 
unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading conduct, 
S 5K2.8 provides "objective standards for its application." 
Id. at 1143. This is a far cry from a ruling that the three 
examples listed in the guideline constitute the universe of 
conduct condemned by that section. Indeed, the guideline 
itself identifies these three examples as just that: non- 
exclusive examples. ("Examples of extreme conduct include 
. . . ." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.8 (emphasis added)). Paster's conduct 
was extreme even if it was not specifically branded with one 
of the three illustrative labels provided in S 5K2.8. 
 
As a second prong of his challenge to the extreme 
conduct finding, Paster argues that his crime was no more 
heinous, cruel, or brutal than that recorded in six other 
cases. As an example, Paster again cites Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 
where the defendant choked the victim to unconsciousness, 
beat the victim with a tire iron, struck the victim in the 
neck with a jack handle, and dumped the victim's body in 
a pond. Id. at 1138. See also United States v. Herrera, 70 
F.3d 444, 445 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Anderson, 5 
F.3d 795, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Luscier, 
983 F.2d 1507, 1509 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1989). While one 
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cannot gainsay the brutality of the conduct perpetrated in 
these cases, it hardly follows that Paster's conduct was less 
deserving of being branded "extreme." 
 
Even if true, however, the fact that other cases involved 
conduct arguably more heinous, cruel, and brutal than 
Paster's by no means proves that the District Court abused 
its discretion by concluding that Paster's conduct was 
outside the heartland of second degree murder cases. 
Murray, 144 F.3d at 275 n.7. In fact, the judge made 
explicit findings about the heinous, cruel, and brutal 
nature of Paster's offense -- particularly supported by the 
pathologist's testimony that it was one of the most severely 
violent deaths he had ever documented, 17 F. Supp.2d at 
349 -- thereby demonstrating an awareness of the relevant 
standard and a commitment to undertake a departure only 
when warranted. All of the foregoing considered, we affirm 
the District Court's decision to enhance Paster's sentence 




Having concluded that the District Court did not abuse 
his discretion by awarding a departure for extreme conduct, 
we turn to Paster's final argument: that the nine-level 
upward departure, which increased by more than seventeen 
years the applicable median sentence, was unreasonable. 
The Sentencing Commission established a 243-month 
spread between the median sentence for first degree 
murder adjusted by a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility (364.5) and the median sentence for second 
degree murder adjusted for the same two-point reduction 
(121.5).8 Yet the sentence levied in this second degree 
murder case is equal to what would be a heavy first degree 
murder sentence. This aspect of the sentence here imposed 
gives us pause. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. At base offense level 43, first degree murder carries a sentence of 
life 
imprisonment; adjusted two levels for acceptance of responsibility, the 
crime yields an incarceration range of 324-405 months. Second degree 
murder, which has a base offense level 33, produces an incarceration 
range of 135-168 months; the range drops to 108-135 months when the 
offense level is adjusted two levels for acceptance of responsibility. 
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"Our review of the sentencing court's decision in this 
regard is deferential," United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 
872 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 
243, 139 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1997), but this court relies upon 
"objective standards to guide the determination of 
reasonableness" -- including analogies within the 
guidelines themselves, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110-13, and 
the guidance afforded by the statutory scheme that they 
implement. In this case, the District Court concluded, and 
both parties acknowledge, that "there are no provisions in 
the guidelines which suggest an analogy from which to 
determine the appropriate level of upward departure." 
Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 350. Nor does our independent 
search for such analogies yield a plausible one.9 
 
Paster proposes as an alternative approach an increase of 
the offense level by analogy to the defendant's criminal 
history category. See, e.g., United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 
1057, 1061-64 (7th Cir. 1990). He notes that even at 
Category VI -- the maximum -- his pre-departure offense 
level of 31 would yield an incarceration range of 188-235 
months, some 104-130 months fewer than he actually 
received. 
 
We find the criminal history analogy inappropriate here. 
As the Kikumura court observed, guidelineS 4A1.3 permits 
a departure "[i]f reliable information indicates that the 
criminal history category does not adequately reflect the 
seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes 
. . . ." 918 F.2d at 1112. In this case, the government did 
not argue, and the District Court did not find, that Paster's 
criminal history category misrepresented the seriousness of 
his past criminal conduct (there was no record of any), or 
the likelihood that he would engage again in the arguably 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For example, S 2A2.1 and S 2A2.12 of the guidelines fix 28 and 16 as 
the base offense levels for assault with intent to commit murder and 
aggravated assault, respectively. Each offense is subject to specific 
upward adjustments for particular offense characteristics, such as five 
levels for aggravated assault if a firearm is used. Neither these specific 
offenses, nor the scheduled adjustments, provide a useful analogy to the 
extreme conduct departure which is to be measured here. 
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aberrant conduct at issue here. Our appraisal of the record 
confirms these conclusions. 
 
Finding no acceptable analogy in the guidelines, the 
District Court surveyed what it considered to be analogous 
case law. The District Judge collected two cases that 
approved five-level upward departures, see Herrera, 70 F.3d 
444, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113, one decision that 
affirmed a ten-level upward departure, United States v. 
Pergola, 930 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1991), and one that upheld 
an eleven-level upward departure, Roberson, 872 F.2d 597. 
From these raw numbers ranging from five to eleven the 
District Court extrapolated nine. Paster argues that the 
four cases cited by the District Court are inapposite 
because they involved more severe offenses, and because 
the upward departures were based only in part on the 
respective defendants' "extreme conduct." The government 
defends the District Court's approach, and at oral 
argument directed us to United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 
34 (2d Cir. 1998), where the court upheld a fourteen-level 
upward departure. 
 
Guidelines construct a bare framework for sentencing 
decisions, and the interstices permit courts to use a 
common law approach to fashion particular sentences. 
However, notwithstanding the substantial deference owed 
the District Court, we have two problems with the case law 
methodology used here. First, the District Court cited the 
several cases without critical analysis of the particular 
extreme conduct and other grounds for departure in those 
cases compared with the nine-level departure here solely for 
extreme conduct; the District Court simply concluded"that 
a nine level upward departure for Paster's extremely brutal 
conduct is warranted." Paster, 17 F. Supp.2d at 350. 
 
We question whether on closer analysis extrapolation 
from the sentences imposed in the four cases referenced by 
the District Court -- and the fifth cited by the government 
at oral argument -- would support a nine-level extreme 
conduct departure here. For example, in Roberson, 872 
F.2d 597, the court affirmed an eleven-level departure, but 
recognized that the district court based the upward 
departure on three discrete grounds, only one of which was 
extreme conduct pursuant to S 5K2.8. Id. at 602. See also 
 
                                21 
  
Morrison, 153 F.3d at 51 (affirming fourteen-level departure 
that was an accumulation of separate two- and three-level 
enhancements linked to consequences suffered by ten 
different victims). The Pergola court approved a ten-level 
departure based, not upon "extreme conduct" (S 5K2.8), but 
upon "extreme psychological injury" (S 5K2.3). Pergola, 930 
F.2d at 218. Finally, both Kikumura and Herrera involved 
upward departures that were only five levels, and 
authorized by more than one guideline. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 
at 1119; Herrera, 70 F.3d at 447. We are not satisfied that 
these cases adequately justify the nine-level upward 
departure at issue here. 
 
There remains the question raised by the convergence of 
the sentence imposed here with the guidelines' prescription 
for first degree murder. To recapitulate, Paster was indicted 
for first degree murder, the elements of which are "the 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought." 18 U.S.C. S 1111(a). After the District Court 
denied Paster's suppression motion, Paster agreed to, and 
the court accepted, a plea of guilty to second degree 
murder. The guilty plea spared Paster, his family, the 
family of his late wife, the government, and the court from 
the anguish which trial of this ugly case would have 
entailed; it also reduced the severity of the applicable 
sentence range to which Paster was exposed. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 1111(b). See also U.S.S.G. SS 2A1.1, 2A1.2. In the 
colloquy about the plea agreement, the probation officer 
and the government advised that the likely sentencing 
range would be 168-210 months, a range consistent with 
base second degree murder and a two-level enhancement. 
Tr. of hearing of 11/19/97, at 13-14. 
 
The statutory maximum for both first and second degree 
murder is life imprisonment, except that in special 
circumstances the death penalty may be imposed upon a 
person convicted of first degree murder. 18 U.S.C. 
S 1111(b). However, the guideline range for a defendant 
guilty of first degree murder with a criminal history of I 
who, after a two-point reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility has an offense level of 41, is 324-405 months 
imprisonment. The guideline range for a defendant guilty of 
second degree murder with a criminal history of I and a 
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two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility is 108- 
135 months imprisonment. 
 
A prime objective of the Sentencing Guidelines was to 
eliminate or, at least reduce, disparity in the sentencing of 
similarly situated defendants. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 3. 
As the Sentencing Commission has stated, "Congress 
sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing 
the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal 
offenses committed by similar offenders." Id. As a corollary 
of this guideline policy, however, the Commission 
recognized that defendants differently situated should 
suffer different sentences because "Congress sought 
proportionality in sentencing through a system that 
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal 
conduct of differing severity." Id. See also United States v. 
Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1411 n.12 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The notion 
of disparity comprehends not only treating similarly 
situated defendants differently, but also treating defendants 
who are dissimilarly situated in some relevant way the 
same."). "Often the best way to test whether a particular 
degree of departure is appropriate is to use other provisions 
of the Guidelines as benchmarks." Herrera, 70 F.3d at 446. 
 
The vice of the nine-level upward departure imposed on 
Paster is that he has incurred for second degree murder a 
sentence that would be appropriate for first degree murder 
adjusted two levels for acceptance of responsibility. Thus, if 
the government had required Paster to plead guilty to first 
degree murder in order to escape the death penalty, 10 and 
he enjoyed a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility (as he did here), he would have faced a 
sentence in the range of 324-405 months,11  the median of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. While the record reflects only that the government ultimately decided 
not to seek the death penalty, see App. at 119-20, 319, it had statutory 
authority to do so. 18 U.S.C. S 1111(b). 
 
11. First degree murder carries a base offense level of 43; assuming a 
two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, an offense level of 
41 
yields a sentence of 324-405 months for a defendant in criminal history 
category I. The applicable range would drop to 292-365 months if a 
three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility were awarded. See 
supra IV. 
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which is the actual sentence that Paster received. 12 This 
lack of disparity between Paster's actual sentence and one 
he could have received had he pleaded guilty to, or been 
convicted of, a more serious crime distorts proportionality, 
a critical objective of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 




       Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's denial of 
departures for aberrant behavior and victim provocation. 
However, we will remand for resentencing to reflect an 
additional one-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. We also will remand with directions to the 
District Court to reconsider the nine-level upward 
departure for extreme conduct after closer examination of 
the relevant court decisions and for consideration of the 
proportionality concerns raised by the coincidence of the 
second degree murder sentence and the prescribed 
sentence for first degree murder. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Had Paster pursued an insanity defense, as he originally intended, 
been convicted of first degree murder, and received a two-point reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility, he likewise would have been exposed to 
an incarceration range of 324-405 months. See U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, 
comment 2 ("Conviction by trial . . . does not automatically preclude a 
defendant from consideration for [an acceptance of responsibility] 
reduction."). See also United States v. Fells, 78 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Barris, 46 F.3d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1995) 
("[D]efendant who goes to trial on an insanity defense, thus advancing an 
issue that does not relate to his factual guilt, may nevertheless qualify 
for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction"). 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join in Parts I through IV of the opinion. I also concur 
in Part V, but note that I would ordinarily agree with the 
government with respect to the nine-level upward 
departure. The District Court's decision to depart is entitled 
to great deference. As the Court stated in Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), "[a] district court's decision to 
depart from the Guidelines . . . will in most cases be due 
substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional 
exercise of discretion by a sentencing court." Id. at 98. See 
also United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d 
Cir. 1990). However, here the majority has raised an issue 
as to the relationship between the Guideline governing first- 
degree murder and that governing second-degree murder 
that fairly requires some further attention by the District 
Court. Therefore, I concur with its decision to remand, as 
long as it is understood that the District Court retains the 
discretion to depart upwards nine levels again should it 
fully explain why it determined to do so. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I join in all of the majority's opinion except for Part III, 
which affirms the District Court's denial of Paster's motion 
for a downward departure based on aberrant behavior. 
Because the District Court's refusal to depart on that 
ground was predicated on a misapprehension of the 
applicable legal standard for an aberrant behavior 
departure, I would remand for re-sentencing so that the 
District Court could reconsider the motion under the 
correct standard. 
 
In United States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994), 
this court, consistent with every other circuit court to have 
considered the issue, recognized that the Guidelines permit 
a sentencing court to downwardly depart in a case where a 
defendant's criminal conduct can fairly be characterized as 
a "single act[ ] of aberrant behavior." Id. at 760 (quoting 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment P 4(d)). The courts of 
appeal are not in agreement, however, as to the correct 
definition of aberrant behavior. A minority of circuits have 
adopted a "totality of the circumstances test" that, as its 
name implies, allows a sentencing court to consider a 
multitude of factors, including a defendant's lack of a 
criminal record and his prior good deeds, in assessing 
whether a downward departure for aberrant behavior is 
appropriate. See Zecevic v. United States Parole 
Commission, 163 F.3d 731, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 564 (1st Cir. 1996).1 
Under the totality test, as explained by its proponents, 
" `when all is said and done, the conduct in question must 
truly be a short-lived departure from an otherwise law- 
abiding life.' " Id. at 735 (quoting United States v. Colace, 
126 F.3d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Zecevic court listed the following factors that courts have 
considered in applying totality of the circumstance test: "(1) the 
singular 
nature of the criminal act; (2) the defendant's criminal record; (3) 
psychological disorders form which the defendant was suffering at the 
time of the offense; (4) extreme pressures under which the defendant 
was operating; (5) letters from friends and family expressing shock at the 
defendant's behavior; and (6) the defendant's motivations in committing 
the crime." 163 F.3d at 735. 
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We considered and rejected the totality approach in 
Marcello. We reasoned that a defendant's criminal history, 
or lack thereof, is already incorporated into the Guidelines' 
sentencing formula, and that it would be inappropriate to 
factor it in once again under the guise of aberrant behavior. 
Marcello, 13 F.3d at 761.2 Instead, we adopted the majority 
view, first articulated by the Seventh Circuit in United 
States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 1990), which 
focuses the aberrant behavior inquiry on the criminal 
conduct itself, not on a defendant's "high standing in the 
community and his lack of prior conviction." Carey, 895 
F.2d at 324. Under this approach, a sentencing court 
considering an aberrant behavior departure must decide 
whether a defendant's criminal behavior was " `a 
spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act rather than one 
which was the result of substantial planning.' " Marcello, 13 
F.3d at 761 (quoting Carey, 895 F.2d at 325). The reason 
for focusing on whether a defendant's criminal act is 
spontaneous and unplanned is that " `an act which occurs 
suddenly and is not the result of a continued reflective 
process is one for which the defendant may be arguably 
less accountable.' " Id. Applying this standard in Marcello, 
we affirmed the district court's conclusion that the 
defendant, who over a one-week period structured bank 
deposits to evade currency transaction reporting 
requirements, was not entitled to an aberrant behavior 
departure because some pre-planning was required to 
commit the offense. Id. Similarly, in Carey, the Seventh 
Circuit held that an aberrant behavior departure was not 
allowed where the defendant had engaged in a check-kiting 
scheme over a fifteen-month period. 895 F.2d at 324 35. 
See also United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 
1991) (no aberrant behavior departure where defendant 
sent five separate letters containing misappropriated 
information over the course of ten weeks); United States v. 
Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1991) (no aberrant behavior 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This conclusion has since been bolstered by the Supreme Court's 
recognition in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996), that the 
Guidelines specifically prohibit a downward departure on the ground 
that a Criminal History Category I fails to reflect a particular 
defendant's 
low likelihood of recidivism. 
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where defendant planned and executed a fraudulent 
financing scheme over a one-year period). 
 
In stark contrast to those cases, all of which involved 
offenses that had been planned for days, weeks or even 
months, in this case the District Court found as a matter 
of fact that "[u]p until a few minutes prior to the stabbing, 
Paster had no plan to kill his wife." Paster, 17 F. Supp. 2d 
345, 348 (M.D. Pa. 1998). The court also noted that "there 
are indications that the murder was spontaneous." Id. at 
351. Despite these findings, however, the District Court 
concluded that it did not have the authority to depart for 
aberrant behavior. The court explained: 
 
       The murder was not committed in a thoughtless 
       manner. Thoughtlessness is an essential element 
       under Marcello, Thoughtfulness [sic] is missing in this 
       case. Paster had ample time in the minutes preceding 
       the stabbing to think about whether to murder his 
       wife. Further, the number of times Paster stabbed his 
       wife indicates that he thought about the act as it was 
       being done. There is no authority to depart on the 
       basis of aberrant behavior under Marcello. We will deny 
       Paster's request for a departure on the basis of 




The problem with this reasoning is that, under the 
District Court's definition of the term "thoughtless," a 
defendant who has any opportunity to consider his crime, 
no matter how fleetingly, would be ineligible for a departure 
based on aberrant behavior. Were this a correct statement 
of law, however, there would be no point in having an 
aberrant behavior departure in the first place because no 
defendant would ever qualify for it, save perhaps a 
hypothetical one concocted for a law school examination. In 
real life, those who commit crimes almost always have 
some opportunity, even if for only a minute or two, but 
typically much longer than that, to consider their actions. 
See Zecevic, 163 F.3d at 734 ("If actions taking place over 
such a short period can be deemed to include sufficient 
planning and preparation to remove them from the realm of 
the `spontaneous and thoughtless,' this standard is limited 
indeed."). 
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Consider, for instance, the defendant in United States v. 
Russell, 870 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1989), a case which is often 
cited as an "excellent example" of aberrant behavior, 
particularly among those courts employing the 
"spontaneous and thoughtless" test. See , e.g, Carey, 895 
F.2d at 325. The defendant was a Wells Fargo armored 
truck driver and his partner was the truck's messenger. A 
bank mistakenly gave the pair an extra bag of money 
containing $80,000, which both men, yielding to 
temptation, decided to keep for themselves. A week later, 
however, Russell confessed the crime, returned the money 
that he had kept, and cooperated with authorities. Under 
the definition of "thoughtless" adopted by the District 
Court, Russell would have been ineligible for an aberrant 
behavior departure because he undoubtedly had some 
opportunity, though perhaps not very long, to contemplate 
whether or not to keep the bank's money. 
 
In my view, the "spontaneous and thoughtless" test does 
not require sentencing courts to literally determine whether 
a defendant, at any time prior to his offense, had time to 
think about his criminal conduct. The answer to that 
question will invariably be yes. Instead, the test asks more 
generally whether the defendant's crime was the product of 
planning and deliberation or, as we stated in Marcello, "a 
continued reflective process." 13 F.3d at 761 (quoting 
Carey, 895 F.2d 325). If it was, then an aberrant behavior 
departure will be unavailable. If it was not, a district court 
should retain the discretion to depart. See United States v. 
Winters, 105 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that "one 
isolated assault" could be considered aberrant behavior, 
but not a subsequent effort to conceal the offense by 
coercing a witness to give false testimony). Applying that 
test to the facts of this case -- where the defendant did not 
plan the murder, the entire episode took place over the 
course of no more than a few minutes, and the defendant 
confessed to the crime within minutes of its commission 
and made no attempt to conceal his culpability -- I would 
hold that the District Court had the discretion to depart 
based on aberrant behavior, and that the District Court's 
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conclusion that it had "no authority" to award the 
departure was an error of law necessitating a remand.3 
 
The majority endorses the District Court's holding that 
Paster is not eligible for an aberrant behavior departure 
because he did not act in a "thoughtless" manner. In 
particular, the majority relies on the District Court's 
observations that Paster had time in the minutes preceding 
the murder to think about his actions, and that Paster 
stabbed his wife so many times that he must have been 
thinking about the murder while he was committing it. Maj. 
Op. at 8-9. In my view, neither of these reasons support the 
conclusion that Paster did not act "thoughtlessly." As to the 
latter, if a defendant who is conscious of his actions during 
the commission of a crime is deemed not to have acted 
aberrantly, then the departure will only be available to that 
minuscule class of defendants who are liable for crimes 
committed by involuntary reflex, and perhaps also to those 
who are in a hypnotic state at the time of their offense. 
Surely this is not what the Sentencing Commission or the 
Marcello panel intended when they recognized that "single 
acts of aberrant behavior" may justify a downward 
departure. U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment P 4(d). 
That Paster may or may not have thought about whether to 
murder his wife in the moments before the stabbing also 
should not be a sufficient basis to disqualify him for an 
aberrant behavior departure. The murder of Dr. Bostrom, 
while undoubtedly a brutal and heinous crime, was 
certainly not the product of any meaningful deliberation or 
reflection on the part of Paster; to the contrary, all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority asserts that the District Court's statement that it had 
"no 
authority to depart on the basis of aberrant behavior under Marcello," 
Paster, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 351, did not really mean what it said (i.e., 
that 
the District Court thought it lacked discretion to grant Paster's 
downward departure motion). Instead, the majority posits, the statement 
merely reflects the District Court's determination that "the facts of this 
case applied to the principles announced in Marcello do not qualify 
Paster for an aberrant behavior departure." Maj. Op. at 11. I cannot 
agree. We must presume that the able and experienced District Judge 
meant precisely what he said in concluding that he had "no authority" 
to grant Paster's downward departure motion. The majority's effort to 
recast the District Court's decision as an exercise of discretion strains 
credulity. 
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indications are that Paster acted spontaneously and in 
response to a series of deeply painful revelations from his 
wife. Under these circumstances, the majority's conclusion 
that Paster failed to act in a "thoughtless" fashion can only 
be justified by the most literal and wooden definition of that 
term. 
 
None of this is to say, however, that an aberrant behavior 
departure was required in this case. Not every crime that is 
committed spontaneously and without prior planning 
merits a reduced sentence. If after analyzing the factual 
record, for example, the District Court concluded that the 
murder of Dr. Bostrom was the culmination of a long- 
standing pattern of domestic violence on the part of Paster, 
then a departure based on aberrant behavior would have 
obviously been inappropriate. A departure would have also 
been unwarranted if the District Court concluded that the 
lack of planning in this case was sufficiently accounted for 
by the base offense level for second-degree murder. 
U.S.S.G. S 2A1.2; see generally Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996). But the District Court never reached 
these issues. It summarily concluded that it had "no 
authority" under Marcello to depart because Paster's 
criminal act was not committed in a "thoughtless" manner. 
Because that conclusion was based on an erroneous and 
overly restrictive understanding of the legal standard 
governing an aberrant behavior departure, we should allow 
the District Court to reconsider this issue at re-sentencing. 
 
* * * 
 
Finally, I offer a brief comment concerning the District 
Court's grant of a nine-level departure for extreme conduct, 
which nearly tripled the sentence that Paster received. 
Judge Oberdorfer has carefully identified the reasons why 
the structure of the Guidelines and the applicable case law 
render the magnitude of that departure unreasonable. I 
shall not repeat them here. I add only that at re-sentencing, 
for those same reasons, the District Court should not again 
impose a nine-level upward departure. While Judge Sloviter 
is of course correct that the District Court's decision to 
depart is entitled to great deference, it is equally true that: 
 
       A judge may not say: "I have decided to depart, so I 
       now throw away the guidelines." The guidelines are 
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       designed to bring openness and consistency to 
       sentencing, to even out the effects of different judges' 
       perspectives on desert and deterrence. . . . Unless there 
       is discipline in determining the amount of departure, 
       however, sentencing disparity will reappear. 
 
United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 
1990) (citation omitted). In my view, the nine-level 
departure imposed in this case is emblematic of the very 
sentencing disparities that the Guidelines were designed to 
counter. It should not be repeated. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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